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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
10		) Civil No. 11cv963-L(MDD)
11	T&S ENTERPRISES, LLC,	ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO
12	Plaintiff,	STATE COURT
13	v.	
14	SUMITOMO CORPORATION OF AMERICA,	
15	Defendant.	
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18	On May 4, 2011 Defendant filed a notice of removal, removing this breach of contract	
19	and fraud action from State court. The notice of removal is based on diversity jurisdiction	
20	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332.	
21	"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power	
22	authorized by Constitution or a statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be	
23	presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the	
24	contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,	
25	511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684	
26	(9th Cir. 2006).	
27	Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is strictly	
28	construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992);	

Case 3:11-cv-00963-L-MDD Document 4 Filed 05/09/11 PageID.76 Page 1 of 3

see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); O'Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. "The traditional rule of burden allocation in determining removal jurisdiction was meant to comport with what the Supreme Court has termed '[t]he dominant note in the successive enactments of Congress relating to diversity jurisdiction,' that is, 'jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to state sensitiveness, and of relieving the federal courts of the overwhelming burden of business that intrinsically belongs to the state courts in order to keep them free for their distinctive federal business." Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 685, quoting Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941).

Defendant removed this action based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a). Original jurisdiction exists in cases of complete diversity, where each of the plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants, and the amount in controversy exceeds \$ 75,000. 28 U.S.C. §1332(a); *Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis*, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).

For Plaintiff's citizenship, Defendant relies entirely on the allegation in the complaint that it is a "California Limited Liability Company." (Notice of Removal at 2.) The citizenship of an artificial entity, including a limited partnership or a limited liability company, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is determined by examining the citizenship of each of its members. *Carden v. Arkoma Assoc.*, 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990). In the absence of stating the citizenship of each of Plaintiff's members, Defendant failed to meet its burden to show that this action is removable.

The facts presented in the notice of removal do not meet the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction. "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). This action is

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**REMANDED** to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego, Central District. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 9, 2011 United States District Court Judge COPY TO: HON. MITCHELL D. DEMBIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL 

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